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The introduction of payments for environmental services (PES) offers an opportunity for traditional
and indigenous populations to be compensated for contributing to carbon sequestration in meeting
the challenge of ameliorating global warming. As one mechanism among several for promoting
biodiversity conservation and sustainable development, pro-poor PES initiatives could eventually be
incorporated into an international post-Koyoto framework to encourage reduced emissions from
deforestation. Brazil’s Proambiente PES scheme for small farmers in Amazonia has enjoyed some
limited success, but it has fallen short of expectations. Its performance has been undermined by the
lack of a national legal framework, limited funding, reduced implementation capacity, poor cross-
sector collaboration and incompatibility with existing regional development policies. These
challenges are being addressed by the federal government in cooperation with civil society with a
view to scaling up Proambiente into a national programme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The growing pace of Amazon deforestation has become
a key issue in the debate on climate change. Globally,
land use changes including forest loss account for
approximately 18–20% of total greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. Yet Amazonian deforestation is responsible
for three-quarters of GHG emissions in Brazil, which
is itself the world’s fourth largest emitter after China,
the US and Russia. Since the 1960s, the Brazilian
Amazon has been treated as a virtually free resource
to be exploited in the name of national development
with little or no regard for the huge environmental
and social costs involved. With some 20% of Brazil’s
Amazon rainforest now lost to clear-felling, over half
of the region has been adversely impacted by human
activity. It has been estimated that up to 50% of
the country’s rainforest could disappear by 2050,
generating a regional average temperature rise of up
to 48C and a rainfall reduction as high as 20%, with
disastrous consequences including widespread ‘savan-
nization’ and forest die-back (Betts et al.2 0 0 8 ;
Greenpeace 2006; INPE 2007; Nepstad et al. 2008;
Sawyer 2008).
Successive military and civilian governments have
since the 1960s encouraged settlement through cattle
ranching,logging,soybeancultivationandoccupationby
small farmers. Historically, producers in the Amazon
havebeenactivelyencouragedtoremovetherainforestas
proof of ‘productive’ activity under land-titling laws and
for the acquisition of credit. Environmental policy has
beenbasedonconservationinprotectedareasbackedup
by punitive, command-and-control measures. These are
necessary but of limited effectiveness on their own in
ﬁghtingincreasingratesofdeforestationintheregionand
the consequent loss of environmental services such as
carbon sequestration, biodiversity preservation and
watershed management.
A major challenge facing policy-makers today is thus
how to move away from the current system of perverse
incentives which stimulates deforestation, and towards
policies that encourage forest preservation along with
more sustainable forms of land settlement and
production. The present paper examines Brazil’s very
embryonic efforts at persuading small farmers to adopt
such practices by paying them for environmental
services rendered, encouraging them to limit forest
removal, reduce destructive activities such as continu-
ous slash-and-burn farming and set up more sedentary,
ecologically friendly production systems such as
agroforestry and extractivism.
After reviewing Amazon settlement policies and the
potential importance of providing payments for
environmental services (PES) to small farmers, the
experience of Brazil’s pro-poor Proambiente PES
programme will be examined.
1 It will be argued that,
despite being fraught with problems, Proambiente is one
tool among many which could reward small producers
for enhancing carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation. If an international post-Kyoto framework
for encouraging reduced emissions from deforestation
(RED) beyond 2012 is negotiated under the auspices
of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), funds for this purpose
could be channelled from the North to the South
through ofﬁcial aid and/or carbon trading.
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For as long as the development of Amazonia has been
discussed in scientiﬁc and policy circles, the role of its
traditional and indigenous populations in moulding the
region’s past and its future has been marginalized. This
was most apparent during the early days of the modern
settlement era in the 1970s, when the Amazon was
treated as a demographic void by Brazil’s military rulers
who urged the allocation of ‘land without men to men
withoutland’(Hall1989).Thisconvenientlyignoredthe
presence of pre-existing populations as the generals
pursued a number of diverse and often conﬂicting
goals. These ranged from national integration and
economicmodernizationtopovertyalleviationandsocial
stabilization in other regions of the country through the
export of ‘surplus’ people to the ‘empty’ frontier.
For three decades, strong ofﬁcial backing was given
to large landowners and investors in key sectors such as
livestock, logging and mining, which monopolized
government subsidies. Small settlers, in contrast, were
drawn to the region but then usually denied signiﬁcant
support and largely abandoned to their fate. Further-
more, in an exercise of ‘blaming the victims’, they were
often portrayed by the politically powerful as destroyers
of the environment who made little positive contri-
bution to regional progress (Bourne 1978; Schmink &
Wood 1978; Branford & Glock 1985; Mahar 1988;
Hecht & Cockburn 1989). For many years, the word
povo (the ‘people’) was literally, in the eyes of most
politicians and ofﬁcial policy-makers, a four-letter
word, the very antithesis of development.
This perception was challenged in the late 1980s and
1990s by the people themselves. Amazonia’s social
movements—the rubber tappers, small producers and
indigenous groups—vociferously reminded the world
that they too played a key role in using and conserving
natural resources while promoting economic develop-
ment and serving national interests (Hall 1997). In
protest at growing deforestation and abuses such as the
murder of rubber tappers’ leader Francisco ‘Chico’
Mendes in 1988, the international environmental
lobby, foreign aid agencies and global public opinion
generally aligned with domestic groups to pursue a
new policy agenda highlighting the contribution of
local populations to the sustainable development of
Amazonia. This came at a propitious moment in the
wake of the Brundtland Report (1987), followed by the
Earth Summit (1992) held in Rio de Janeiro, a
combination of events which sparked signiﬁcant
environmental policy changes and institutional
reorganization in Brazil under Presidents Fernando
Collor de Mello and Jose ´ Sarney (Hall 2000).
Yet despite this recent trend, mainstream environ-
mental policy in the Amazon has been dominated by a
command-and-control approach based on conserva-
tion together with the application of punitive measures
against those found guilty of breaking the law.
Implementation is notoriously difﬁcult in an area a
huge as Amazonia. In 2005 Brazil’s environmental
control agency IBAMA allocated 850 ofﬁcials to a
region of 1.9 million square miles, one staff member for
every 2300 square miles on average. Operations are
generally under-funded and only a very small pro-
portion of ﬁnes is ever collected.
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Approximately 40% of Brazilian Amazonia is
currently set aside in protected areas for both total
conservation and sustainable use, including indigenous
reserves. Over 60% of this area involves the direct
participation of resource-user populations in managing
these units. A range of projects and programmes both
within and outside of these protected areas has been
developed to directly beneﬁt local groups such as
extractivists, small farmers, ﬁshing communities and
indigenous groups; and producers of various kinds
whose livelihoods depend upon the non-destructive use
of natural resources but which also contribute to local
economic development (Hall 1997). Approximately
20% of Brazilian Amazonia’s current population of
some 20 million, or approximately 4 million rural
inhabitants, still depend for their economic survival on
the region’s natural resources. These include, for
example, extraction of tree fruits and other crops,
agroforestry systems, community-based logging, sus-
tainable ﬁshing and pasture management.
Yet despite signiﬁcant progress in this area, the vast
majority of small farmer settlers in the Amazon still
practise traditional slash-and-burn farming, which
contributestogrowingdeforestationandenvironmental
degradation. It is estimated that they are responsible for
approximately 20% of deforestation in Brazilian Ama-
zonia overall. Cattle ranching and illegal logging (as
well as soybean indirectly) account for approximately
70% and mining for the remainder (Fearnside 2005).
By incorporating traditionally marginalized small farm-
ers into sustainable development initiatives such as
PES, the loss of forest cover and associated environ-
mental services could be ameliorated.
3. PES AND RED
Environmental or ecosystem services ‘are the con-
ditions and processes through which natural ecosys-
tems, and the species that make them up, sustain and
fulﬁl human life’ (Daily 1997, p. 3). Speciﬁc environ-
mental services associated with preservation and
agricultural diversiﬁcation include carbon sequestra-
tion, watershed management, biodiversity conservation
and the preservation of landscape beauty. To qualify for
PES, services rendered should ideally be measurable;
for example in terms of tons of carbon captured,
biodiversity preserved, deforestation avoided or
volume of clean water supplied. PES projects should
be monitored for compliance and their performance
certiﬁed before payments are made to service providers
(Wunder 2005).
Ofﬁcial subsidies for Amazon settlement have
historically encouraged deforestation rather than con-
servation.
3 Yet PES could help alter this perverse
pattern. One such set of policies involves providing
ﬁnancial rewards to rural landowners and resource-
users who adopt environmentally friendly practices,
ranging from outright conservation to sustainable
development techniques. Financial compensation in
the form of PES rendered would reward resource-users
for their efforts to either preserve forests and other
natural resources intact, and/or introduce production
systems that generate economic surplus and sustain
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Measures include the conservation of forested areas
designated as ‘legal reserves’ under Brazil’s Forest
Code (1965), replanting of forests, introduction of
agroforestry systems, extraction offorest products such
as rubber, fruits and nuts, reduction or elimination of
ﬁre-use in land preparation, pasture management and
so on. PES schemes offer the potential for channelling
ﬁnancial rewards to groups of small landowners and
resource users whose environmental contribution
would otherwise remain unrecognized by mainstream
government policy, which generally favours large-scale,
export-oriented commercial producers.
Policy initiatives to reduce the rate of tropical
deforestation are especially relevant in Brazil where
forest loss is responsible for three-quarters of national
GHG emissions and contributes signiﬁcantly to global
warming (Stern 2006). This discussion is also poignant
inthe lightofpressuresbysome developingcountriesto
introducethenotionof‘avoideddeforestation’asavalid
criterion for carbon offsetting. This is currently not
permitted under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) during the ﬁrst phase of the Kyoto Protocol
(2008–2012), which allows offsets to be generated only
through reforestation and afforestation projects.
However, the issue of reduced emissions from defores-
tation (RED) is under consideration by the scientiﬁc
body of the UNFCCC. This refers to the maintenance
of standing forest in order to reduce GHG emissions
(Ebeling & Yasue ´ 2008; Lemos & Roberts 2008).
Pressure is mounting to include incentives for RED
during the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol after
2012. The World Bank is leading this initiative and is
seeking approval from the G8 for a ‘Global Forest
Alliance’ (GFA) which would bring together major
conservation NGOs and the private sector. Within the
GFA,a$300millionForestCarbonPartnershipFacility
(FCPF)wouldpilottestschemesforreducingemissions
from deforestation. Even Brazil, which for a variety of
reasons has long resisted such pressures (Fearnside
2001), has warmed somewhat to the idea. Although it
currently rejects the market-based approach suggested
by the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CRN 2007),
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Brazil has proposed instead a ‘compensated reduction’
facilitytopaycountriesthatreduceratesofdeforestation
from an international donor fund (Santilli et al. 2005;
Lemos & Roberts 2008).
4. PES AND PROAMBIENTE
This section will consider the emergence of PES
policies in Brazil and the conception of Proambiente as
a mechanism for beneﬁting small farmers in the
Amazon. It examines the structure and initial results
of the scheme in compensating small producers,
together with some implications for future PES policy
in Brazil, before considering wider issues under
proposed RED initiatives.
(a) The PES principle
PES in Brazil have so far been delivered largely through
industrial carbon sequestration initiatives under the
CDM such as landﬁll projects as well as a handful of
forestry schemes mainly outside of the Amazon.
5 Yet
the potential for including small farmers and other
resource users in certain key areas of Amazonia as part
of a future RED strategy for emissions reductions
policy could be signiﬁcant. This would serve not just as
one vital element of environmental action, offering
ﬁnancial incentives to enhance conservation and
development efforts. It would also strengthen people’s
livelihoods and help support the activities of those
grassroots groups that act as custodians of the forest
and suppliers of key services. Research elsewhere has
shown that ‘direct payments beneﬁt poor farmers by
improving cash ﬂows, providing a fungible store of
wealth, and diversifying sources of household income’
(Ferraro & Kiss 2002, p. 1718).
In Brazil, the potential of such direct payments for
promoting conservation and development was realized
early on. In 2000 rural unions, environmental NGOs
and community groups in Brazil’s Amazon region
jointly conceived a ‘Programme for the Socio-Environ-
mental Development of Rural Family Production’
(Proambiente), following lengthy debates over the
future of small-scale production in Amazonia.
6 This
would reward small farmers and other producers for
providing environmental services in 12 key areas or
‘poles’ distributed over several Amazon states.
7 With
the election in late 2002 of Luiz Ina ´cio Lula da Silva,
Brazil’s ﬁrst working class president, and a PT
government seen as favourable to grassroots interests,
the project was transferred from civil society to the
Ministry of the Environment from 1 January, 2004.
Proambiente is ‘.directed at rural family production,
agro-forestry, extractivism, ﬁshing, indigenous and
other forms of traditional production.’ Under the
scheme, such groups ‘.would cease to be regarded
merelyassuppliersofprimaryproducebutbevaluedfor
their multi-functional contributions to economic
production, social inclusion and preservation of the
environment. (facilitating). compensation for
environmental services rendered to Brazil and the
world’ (Proambiente 2003, pp. 2–6). Speciﬁc environ-
mental services in this context were deﬁned as:
(i) reduction or avoidance of deforestation; (ii) carbon
sequestration; (iii) recuperation of ecosystem hydro-
logicalfunctions;(iv)soilconservation;(v)preservation
of biodiversity; and (vi) reduction offorest ﬁre risks.
Avoided deforestation and carbon sequestration
would be monitored through direct indicators, and
the remaining impacts via indirect measures inherent in
the programme’s certiﬁcation process (Proambiente
2003). In this way, it was expected that reductions in
forest loss and the amount of carbon thus captured by
changes in land use against an established baseline
could be monitored for each development ‘pole’.
The process followed a number of ﬁxed stages:
(i) preparation of sustainable development plans for
communities (Planos de Desenvolvimento Sustenta ´vel),
(ii) drawing up of resource utilization plans (Planos de
Utilizac ¸a ˜o), (ii) negotiation of community agreements
(Acordos Comunita ´rios), (iii) auditing of activities for
their rendering of environmental services (Auditorias
de Campo), (iv) certiﬁcation of activities (Ce ´dula de
Certiﬁcac ¸a ˜odeServic ¸osAmbientais),and(v)disbursement
of payments.
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a combination of satellite imagery, mapping and ﬁeld
checks on the ground. Assuming a favourable outcome,
participating households would be paid the equivalent
ofhalf a minimum salaryper month (US$95) to reward
the provision of environmental services. This veriﬁca-
tion process would be repeated on an annual basis to
justify the continuation of such payments. Shortfalls
in the provision of environmental services by partici-
pants would result in reduced monthly payments on a
sliding scale.
Proambiente is conceived in principle as a cross-
sector initiative involving various ministries although,
as noted below, such collaboration has proved proble-
matic. Led by the Ministryof the Environment (MMA)
under the Secretariat for Extractivism and Sustainable
Development, agricultural extension support is pro-
vided through the Ministry of Agrarian Development
(MDA) and its Secretariat for Family Agriculture. In
the original plan, subsidized credit for small producers
(PRONAF) was to be made available via the MDA and
the Bank of Brazil, although this has not materialized
due to a series of problems mentioned below.
Certiﬁcation would be the responsibility of the ofﬁcial
agricultural research organization EMBRAPA and
other agencies, while monitoring of carbon stocks
would be undertaken by the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MCT), EMBRAPA and the civil house-
hold (casa civil) of the Presidency.
A Socio-EnvironmentalFund(Fundo Socioambiental)
tobeadministeredbytheMMAwasconceivedtoﬁnance
payments to farmers, bringing together ﬁxed sources
from government and variable contributions from
international donors and private companies, including
carbon offset purchases (Proambiente 2003). Following
successful piloting of Proambiente, it was hoped that the
PES principle would be substantially scaled up and
applied as a national policy.
(b) Results and challenges for Proambiente
After 4 years under implementation, Proambiente has
had mixed results. Of the 12 original ‘poles’, 10 have
become operational with some 4200 participating
families, of whom a total of 1768 (42%) have received
total payments averaging R$650 (US$325) per house-
hold (Viana et al. 2006). For legal reasons it has not so
far been possible to set up a permanent fund as
originally envisaged. Thus, it was necessary to seek
‘emergency’ support through the Demonstration Pro-
jects component of the G7 Pilot Programme, which has
historically supported Proambiente-type activities in
agroforestry, extractivism and related ﬁelds. Yet this
was a stop-gap solution that could not do justice to the
project’s original ﬁnancial objectives in paying farmers.
This is, not unsurprisingly, regarded by Proambiente
farmers very much as a token payment that fell far short
of what had been promised.
Prophetically, an ofﬁcial assessment of the prospects
for Proambiente made shortly after the project’s hand-
over to government in 2004 had already predicted that
a shortage of funding and support capacity would
enable less than half of the programme’s target number
offamilies to be reached beyond the 2-year initial phase
(MMA 2004). Despite the limited scale and effectively
‘pilot’ nature of Proambiente, however, the government
hopes to use it as a model for the introduction of a
national PES programme (Viana et al. 2006). Yet
before this is even remotely possible, a number of major
ﬁnancial, legal, political and bureaucratic challenges
have to be addressed.
The ﬁrst hurdle to be overcome is the lack of legal
recognition in Brazil at federal level for the concept of
environmental services and their economic value.
Though Brazilian legislation makes provision for
water-use charges, for example, it does not place an
economic value on the water-conservation role of
landowners. Brazil has a number of instruments that
provide PES, but it has no national PES policy. Closely
allied to this is a second major obstacle, the absence of a
permanent source of public funding drawn from
taxation and compensatory economic instruments to
guarantee some ﬁnancial continuity for Proambiente.
Brazil’s ﬁrst such legislation has recently been
enacted by the state government of Amazonas, which
in June 2007 introduced a ‘Law on climatic change,
environmental conservation and sustainable develop-
ment’
8 (Amazonas 2007; Radiobra ´s 2007). A ‘Sustain-
able Amazonas Foundation’ has been set up with a
trust fund of R$40 million (US$20 million). Half is
provided by the state government and half by the
Bradesco bank. Further funds will be raised from
the sale of carbon credits for avoided deforestation in
the voluntary market, generating up to an estimated
US$100 million a year (FOE 2007). Under the
scheme, a monthly ‘forest grant’ (Bolsa Floresta)o f
R$50 (US$25) will be paid to over 4000 households in
ﬁve ‘sustainable development’ protected areas, extend-
ing to 8500 families by the end of 2008. The aim is to
support traditional populations in their pursuit of non-
destructive activities such as extractivism, ﬁshing and
tree fruit cultivation and to discourage illegal deforesta-
tion. In future, Brazil’s states could bear a primary
responsibility for forest management and introduction
of PES schemes.
9
Federal legalization for PES is being addressed by
the national government (in late 2007) through draft
bills, two of which have been presented in the Chamber
of Deputies, and a third is to be added.
10 When and if
approved by Congress, this new legislation would
establish the concept of PES in Brazil and set up a
National Programme of PES or ‘Green Fund’ (Bolsa
Verde) for small farmers to be ﬁnanced by international
donations. A third bill is to be introduced by the
Executive which would attempt to secure more
permanent funding from the national budget and a
variety of other domestic as well as international
sources.
11 Together, these three bills could provide a
legal and ﬁnancial basis for expanding Proambiente into
a national programme. It has been estimated that a
large-scale PES programme involving 10% of Brazilian
Amazonia’s small farmer population in degraded areas
would cost R$90 (US$45) million a year to conserve
3.75 Mha—approximately one-tenth of the rainforest
(Viana et al. 2006). However, it would also be necessary
to increase core government funding for the MMA,
whose implementation capacity has been undermined
by inadequate allocations and by spending cutbacks,
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A third set of issues concerns the compatibility of
Proambiente with other government policies for small
producers and the extent of cooperation among
relevant ministries and implementing agencies.
12 For
example, small-scale rural production is the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA)
which uses diverse lines of agricultural credit through
its National Programme for Strengthening Family
Farming (PRONAF). However, the bulk of this
funding (85%) is geared towards investments and
running costs for low-risk borrowers regarded favour-
ably by bank managers. These categories (C, D and E)
involve more conventional agro-livestock systems
providing predictable income ﬂows, collateral and
with low rates of default (up to 2%). Credit for poorer
farmers on agrarian reform settlements and for special
groups such as youth and women (categories A, B and
A/C) is heavily subsidized (40%) and carries default
rates of over 30%.
Bank managers are reluctant to release funds for
Proambiente-type activities, especially for the typically
poorerfarmersonsettlementschemes,sinceagroforestry
and similar activities have traditionally been considered
‘unproductive’ due to their innovative and sometimes
uncertain nature. They have a longer-term time horizon
in which income ﬂows can be unpredictable compared
with normal farming systems. This induces extreme
caution on the part of local bank ofﬁcials, who tend to
havelittleknowledgeoftheseareas.Ittakesseveralyears,
for example, for planted trees to yield an income from
fruit or timber sales, unlike with cattle or conventional
food crops.
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‘Environmentally friendly’ credit lines have recently
been introduced within PRONAF, but these are
also unsuitable for most Proambiente activities.
For example, 84% of ‘PRONAF-Forests’ funding is
allocated to larger-scale reforestation schemes for
Eucalyptus rather than agroforestry projects.
‘PRONAF-Agroecology’ requires detailed feasibility
studies and is not suitable for small farmers in the
absence of such technical assistance. ‘PRONAF-ECO’
isforwaterandenergyprojects,alsograntedonthebasis
of prior technical studies. Thus, one of the demands
from extension workers and farmers involved in
Proambiente is that MDA/PRONAF policies should be
realigned with changing needs, a proposal that meets
with signiﬁcant internal resistance in the ministry itself.
Another related issue concerns the provision of
agricultural extension support to Proambiente farmers.
This is sub-contracted on an annual basis by the MDA
to local non-governmental organizations. However,
delays of several months in contract renewals have led
to a lack of continuity in service provision, often at key
points in the agricultural calendar, generating consider-
able frustration among NGOs and farmers. This has
led to high rates of staff turnover (MMA 2004).
Furthermore, state government extension services are
rarely attuned to the Proambiente ethos and collabor-
ation with their NGO counterparts seems to be an
exception rather than the rule. In 2006, the MDA
launched a new National Programme for Technical
Assistance and Rural Extension (PRONATER), which
aims to foster greater collaboration among federal, state
and non-governmental extension services in support of
small farmers generally, including those participating
in Proambiente (MDA 2006, 2007).
Political bias in the identiﬁcation of Proambiente
‘poles’ has also been raised as a problem that may have
created obstacles to project implementation. Born of
grassroots social movements and taken over by the PT
government, a preference for areas characterized by
traditions of rural trade unionism has been evident.
While positive from a mobilization standpoint, this
could distort the process by leading to the exclusion
from Proambiente of organized but non-unionized
communities. Furthermore, a unionized community
does not necessarily have the organizational attributes
or the social capital necessary to become successfully
involved in a PES scheme. This is a key issue in the case
of Proambiente, in which ‘community agreements’ form
the basis for negotiating and mapping individual and
group sustainable practices. Without a degree of group
solidarity to ensure successful implementation, the
ultimate objectives of certiﬁcation and payments may
be undermined.
Seen in more strategic terms, Proambiente was
originally conceived as part of a longer-term process of
territorialdevelopment intheAmazon inwhichsupport
for small-scale farming would be integrated with other
measures. Fears have been expressed that the failure to
pursue such a coordinated approach with due prior
attentionbeinggiventoorganizationalandmanagement
capacity will frustrate the government’s efforts to
promote sustainable rural development adapted to
regional conditions (MMA 2004; MDA 2005). Thus,
theneedforgreatercollaborationbetweentheministries
of environment and agrarian development in the
execution of Proambiente is evident.
5. CONCLUSION: BETTER RED THAN DEAD
Proambiente is Brazil’s incipient attempt to provide a
system of PES rendered by small producers who are
helping to conserve the Amazon rainforest by adopting
more sustainable farming systems, including agrofor-
estry, extractivism, forest and pasture management,
among others. The need to provide compensation for
RED is being debated under the UNFCCC following
pressure from developing countries for avoided defor-
estation to be included as a valid criterion for carbon
offsets under the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol after
2012. Such trading has already taken place in a small
way through informal carbon markets (Bayon et al.
2006). Indeed, this path is being taken by the state of
Amazonas, as noted above. Many people believe that
further funding could be released, either through the
market or via donor trust funds. The World Bank, for
example, has set up a US$300 million FCPF to pilot
RED schemes. Such initiatives could beneﬁt thousands
of poor family farmers in Amazonia and, indeed, the
tropics generally, who depend for their livelihoods on
natural resources but who struggle to make ends meet.
After just 4 years in operation and having achieved
modest success, Proambiente has demonstrated pitfalls
that threaten to frustrate the realization of this
potential. As noted above, these include funding
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cross-sector coordination and possible political bias in
planning. Very limited payments have been made to
farmers on the basis of equally limited evidence of
environmental service contributions. There has been
almost no effective monitoring, quantiﬁcation or certiﬁ-
cationofsuchservices,norsystematicimpactevaluation.
Rather, it has worked on the basis of trust and a general,
somewhat impressionistic, appreciation of the overall
beneﬁcial nature of participants’ activities. As such,
Proambientehasbeenlabelledasa‘PES-like’schemethat,
in common with many other similar programmes, does
not fulﬁl all the strict criteria involved in a formal PES
exercise but which nevertheless has similar goals
(Wunder 2006, p. 54).
There is another fundamental anomaly in terms of
pursuing environmental versus social objectives. To
conserve the greatest area of forest, large landowners
should be targeted since in Amazonia at least they
occupy most of the region and pose the most serious
threattotheenvironmentoverallthroughillegallogging,
cattle ranching and other commercial activities.
Furthermore, the transaction costs of dealing with a
small number of larger owners would be relatively low.
In terms of social justice, however, smallholders and
other poor resource users should be prioritized,
although they are responsible for a relatively small
percentage of deforestation and are expensive to reach.
At the same time, care has to be taken to protect
the rights of indigenous and traditional populations
(Grifﬁths 2007). It has been argued that PES ‘are best
suited to scenarios of moderate conservation opportu-
nity costs on marginal lands and in settings with
emerging, not realized threats’ (Wunder 2006, p. 48).
Yet in spite of widespread support among NGOs for
PES generally, some members of the academic and
scientiﬁc community in Brazil oppose it on the grounds
that such funds are likely to be monopolized by large-
scale farmers and small producers would be excluded
(ESP 2007). Care would have to be taken to ensure that
support is directed to those areas characterized by
on-going tension over access to land and natural
resources, which places serious pressure on the forest.
There is much potential for targeting small farmers in
precarioussituationswhocouldbeneﬁtfromPESandbe
persuaded to modify their activities. One signiﬁcant
category involves land reform beneﬁciaries, whose
settlement projects currently occupy 8% of Amazonia,
but where the level of deforestation is four times the
regional average. This is due to the fact that small
farmers,lackingalternative,viablemodelsorgovernment
support, continue with slash-and-burn agriculture and
pasture formation as their major livelihood strategies
(Epoca 2007).
Yet many small producers, including the bulk of
those participating in Proambiente, while not exactly
living in harmony with nature, are predisposed in some
measure towards adopting more diversiﬁed, sustain-
able production systems if given the opportunity. They
tend to appreciate the environmental and personal
beneﬁts that accrue, for example, to switching from
slash-and-burn farming to agroforestry and extractive
systems. They also understand that in the longer-term,
the economic returns to perennials can be substantially
larger than for traditional subsistence crops such as
rice, beans and cassava. However, given the initial
opportunity costs of setting up diversiﬁed farming
systems, support is often needed to bridge the gap in
constructing a new livelihood while these activities
come on stream over a period of several years.
ThroughschemessuchasProambienteandother(non-
carbon related) programmes that combat poverty and
deforestation,thesmallfarmersofAmazoniahaveshown
that there are viable alternatives to the destructive
practices that currently cause high rates of forest loss.
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However, adapting this potential speciﬁcally to reducing
GHG emissions and scaling up to regional level will
require muchgreater politicalcommitmentaswell as the
appropriate allocation ofﬁnancial and human resources.
Additional funding targeted at key groups of environ-
mental custodians to support PES could serve to
strengthen environmental policy and complement more
traditional conservation measures. This is especially true
for those producers living close to the economic margin
whose behaviour could be modiﬁed through the
provision of economic incentives and appropriate
technical support.
Payments schemes such as Proambiente could
eventually contribute signiﬁcantly towards averting
global warming, as long as this potential can be
effectively harnessed. The possible integration in due
course of Proambiente and other local–national PES
initiatives into an international programme for promot-
ing RED perhaps offers some cautious optimism for the
future. Such a stance does not of course negate the
potential problems of governance and management
associated with such an ambitious global initiative,
especially as far as Brazilian Amazonia is concerned and
the sensitive political issues are involved. On balance,
however, using PES to promote reduced emissions
from deforestation could help avert the potentially fatal
consequences of current development patterns in
Amazonia upon both the environment and on people’s
livelihoods. In spite of the many challenges which must
be faced, therefore, it is far better to be RED than dead.
Thanks are due to three reviewers who provided valuable
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
ENDNOTES
1Fieldwork on Proambiente was carried out by the author in August
2007. Several project sites were visited in Tocantins and Acre, where
interviews were conducted with farmers, local NGOs and state
governmentofﬁcials. The author would like to express his gratitude to
staff at Brazil’s Ministries of the Environment and Agrarian
Development for their valuable assistance, as well as to Proambiente
project staff and beneﬁciaries interviewed during ﬁeldwork. Special
thanks are due to Shigeo Shiki, Hurben Corre ˆa da Silva and Brent
Millikan for their support.
2Although IBAMA refuses to publish ﬁgures on payment ofﬁnes, it is
generally thought to be around 3–5%. The state government of Mato
Grosso, for example, has made it known that just 2% of its
environmental ﬁnes are collected (ISA 2006).
3From 1971 to 1987 alone, for example, over US$5 billion in tax
incentives andsubsidized creditwas allocatedto cattleranching in the
Amazon (Schneider 1992). Although new incentives were suspended
in 1991, already existing tax breaks as well as subsidized credit have
continued (Fearnside 2000). From 1989 to 2002 the Bank of
Amazonia lent US$5.8 billion to cattle ranchers in the region at
subsidized rates (Arima et al. 2005).
1930 A. Hall Payments for environmental services
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2008)4The Rainforest Coalition is an inter-governmental organization
involving over 30 countries, led by Papua New Guinea and Costa
Rica, which are pledged to offering voluntary reductions in carbon
emissions in exchange for access to international markets for
emissions trading. In December 2005, the UNFCCC Parties agreed
to consider the issue of RED (compensation for avoided deforesta-
tion) with a view to formulating recommendations to be discussed at
the next Convention of the Parties (COP-13) held in December 2007
in Bali, Indonesia.
5The Nova Gerar landﬁll gas scheme in Rio de Janeiro was the ﬁrst
project ofﬁcially registered under the CDM. A small number of
forestry projects based on reforestation of degraded areas have been
undertaken in Minas Gerais (Plantar and Peugeot) and Mato Grosso
(Bananal Island). See May et al. (2003) and Grieg-Gran et al. (2005).
The Botica ´rio Foundation has also announced plans to pay $12
million over 10 years to landowners who preserve the Atlantic
Rainforest at the headwaters of Greater Sa ˜oP a u l o ’ sr i v e r s
(Nascimento Madureira 2006). This is comparable with schemes
introduced elsewhere such as Colombia.
6This processwas initiated by rural tradeunion federations and major
NGOs, such as IPAM and FASE, with ﬁnancial support from the
Ministry of the Environment, the State University of New York
(SUNY) and the Ford Foundation.
7Namely, Para ´, Tocantins, Acre, Mato Grosso, Amapa ´, Roraima,
Amazonas and Maranha ˜o.
8Lei de Mudanc ¸as Clima ´ticas e Conservac ¸a ˜o Ambiental.
9In addition to Amazonas, the states of Acre and Parana ´ are
considering setting up state-led PES systems.
10Projeto de Lei 792 (2007) introduced by Deputy Anselmo de Jesus
(PT-Roraima) and Projeto de Lei 1190 (2007) authored by Deputy
Antonio Palocci (PT-Sa ˜o Paulo).
11The preliminary text of this third bill was discussed at the third
meeting of the Proambiente Governing Council on 28–29 August 2007.
It will probably be appended to the other two bills for the passage
throughCongress.Possiblefundingsourcesincludefueltaxes(CIDE),
thepetrolandenvironmentcompensationfund,theEcologicalVAT,the
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES),
regional development funds (FCOand FNO), as well external funding
from aid and private sources (Arruda et al.2 0 0 7 ).
12Observations in this section are based on interviews with staff at the
Ministry of Agrarian Development, Brasilia, and conversations with
Proambiente staff in the ﬁeld, August 2007.
13For example, one of the most popular agroforestry crops is cupuac ¸u
(Theobromagrandiﬂorum),whichrequires4–5yearstoyieldaviableﬁrst
harvest. For valuable hardwoods such as mahogany, this period is
measured in decades rather than years.
14Otherprogrammesinclude:theG7PilotProgrammetoConservethe
BrazilianRainforest,thePlantoCombatAmazonianDeforestation,the
National Pact for the Valorization of the Forest and the End of
Deforestationin Amazonia and the 2-year moratorium agreed between
NGOs and major agribusiness corporations on trading in soya bean
produced in newly deforested areas (Hall 2000; Greenpeace 2007).
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